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NEGLIGENT PUBLICATION OF STATEMENTS
POSTED ON ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARDS:
IS THERE ANY LIABILITY LEFT AFTER ZERAN?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet' has challenged the legal community to ap-
ply common law legal theories to modern "high tech" issues.
Case law and subsequent law review articles have addressed
legal issues involving the liability of Online Service Providers
(OSPs) in areas of defamation,2 copyright infringement,3
trademark infringement,4 and various First Amendment is-5
sues.
The courts, however, have not yet addressed the follow-
ing question: is the system operator6 of an electronic bulletin
board7 liable for the property damage or personal injury that
results from a person's reliance on inaccurate information
posted on the operator's electronic bulletin board? More spe-
cifically, can a person bring a negligent misrepresentation' or
a strict liability claim9 against a system operator who know-
ingly posts the misstatements of a third person on an elec-
tronic bulletin board?
1. The Internet is an interconnected system of computer networks that
allows individuals, through the use of a computer, to communicate with other
users all over the world. See generally Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of
Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring
on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391 (1995) (providing definitions of
various computer related technical terms).
2. See James F. Breisford, Online Liability Issues: Defamation, Invasion of
Privacy and Negligent Publishing, 482 PLI/PAT 471 (1997).
3. See Ian C. Ballon, Intellectual Property Protection and Related Third
Party Liability, 482 PLI/PAT 559 (1997).
4. See id.
5. See John Gladstone Mills, III, Entertainment on the Internet: First
Amendment and Copyright Issues, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 461
(1997).
6. See discussion infra Part II.A.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8. See discussion infra Part II.E.1.
9. See discussion infra Part II.E.2.
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Companies are increasingly using the Internet and elec-
tronic bulletin boards to facilitate communication with cus-
tomers. ° Companies must, therefore, be aware of the possi-
ble liability electronic bulletin boards can create. How
property damage or personal injury might result from the
negligent publication of inaccurate content on an electronic
bulletin board is best illustrated by the following hypotheti-
cal.
Suppose a large software manufacturer offers access to
its online technical support bulletin board as part of the pur-
chase of its software product. The company offers the bulle-
tin board to allow users of the software product to interact
and communicate with one another about the company's
products. This company-controlled bulletin board enables
anyone to post questions about the software product, and
anyone who accesses the bulletin board can post an answer to
the inquiry. The online electronic bulletin board is offered
only to purchasers of the product and is monitored and con-
trolled by the software manufacturer.
Assume someone posts on the bulletin board, "I have a
problem doing X with my computer," and someone else re-
sponds by posting "I had that problem, try changing Y on
your computer." Assume further that the system operator
company employee recognizes that the information is in fact
false, but posts the information anyway. A third person, also
a customer, reads the dialogue posted on the bulletin board
and modifies her computer as indicated in the dialogue on the
bulletin board. This adjustment results in property damage
and/or personal injury.
This hypothetical presents legal questions that sound
familiar to issues presented under the common law theory of
negligent publication. However, the example contains a new
twist-it involves the use of the Internet and an electronic
bulletin board as the medium of communication. The courts
have yet to consider the facts presented in the hypothetical.
When the proper case is presented, legislation,11 case law
10. Technical support sites are often included with purchases of hardware




11. See discussion infra Part IID.
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dealing with the Internet and defamation, 2 and common law
negligent publication 3 may provide the legal framework for
the court's analysis. This comment discusses these common
law legal theories and provides an analysis of the possible li-
ability that the hypothetical presents.
Part II presents some technical background pertaining to
the Internet and considers common law theories that have
been applied to the Internet. Specifically, common law defa-
mation and defamation law as applied to the Internet will be
discussed to understand how "system operators" and "service
providers" have been legally defined by Congress and subse-
quently interpreted by the courts to determine liability for
the publication of third party statements. 4 Also, Zeran v.
America Online, Inc.," will be examined because the Zeran
court interpreted section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA) 6 to give broad immunity to system provid-
ers that publish third party statements on the Internet."
Specifically, the court held that "[section] 230 creates a fed-
eral immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service." 8
Although stated in the context of a defamation claim, 9
the holding in Zeran conflicts with other common law legal
theories (other than defamation) that find liability when a
person knowingly allows inaccurate information to be pub-
lished-liability known as negligent publication. Thus, the
legal background to this theory of liability will be discussed. °
12. See discussion infra Part II.D.
13. See discussion infra Part II.E.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998).
16. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (West 1996).
17. Id. See also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(granting summary judgment to the system operator because of the immunity
granted by the CDA, even though it paid the defendant gossip columnist who
created allegedly defamatory statements).
18. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added).
19. The plaintiff in Zeran actually asserted a negligence claim because he
knew that the CDA would have precluded a defamation claim. "The court dis-
missed this as artful pleading and treated Zeran's complaint as a defamation
claim." Jeffrey G. Raphelson, Old Laws, New Laws, and New Technology: A
Summary of Some of the Laws Affecting Use of the Internet, 77 MICH. B.J. 1202,
1207 (1998).
20. See discussion infra Part II.E.
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Two kinds of negligent publication claims will be presented:
(1) negligent publication based on misrepresentation2' and (2)
negligent publication based on strict liability for defective
products.22
Part III of the comment articulates the legal problem:
the broad holding of Zeran conflicts with the common law le-
gal theory of negligent publication. Did Congress intend to
immunize system operators from any cause of action involv-
ing posting of third party statements on electronic bulletin
boards by system operators or did Congress only intend to
immunize system operators from defamation claims?
23
In Part IV, this comment contends that the Zeran court
was too broad in its holding and that the CDA should only be
construed to immunize system operators in the context of
defamation claims. Traditional theories of negligent publica-
tion based on misrepresentation should still be applied to
system operators of specialized bulletin boards, such as tech-
nical support sites, when they negligently publish inaccurate
content. Further, this comment argues that defective content
posted on a technical support electronic bulletin board can be
defined as a "product" for the purpose of finding strict liabil-
ity for defective products. 4
Part V articulates a proposal to help define how the
courts should apply negligent publication cases in light of the
Zeran decision. First, Congress should address this broad in-
terpretation in Zeran in order to clarify whether or not it in-
tended to grant such broad immunity to all system opera-
tors.25 Second, courts should recognize that the CDA was
enacted in light of defamation claims against online service
providers and construe the CDA narrowly when deciding
whether or not to deny a plaintiff a cause of action not based
21. See discussion infra Part II.E.1.
22. See discussion infra Part II.E.2. The defective product here would be
defective "content" found on the bulletin board.
23. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (West Supp.
1998).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. The CDA was enacted because Congress wished to address the court's
holding in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Inc., 23 Med. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1794, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). "The congressional Conference Committee
Report specifically states that section 509(c)(1) [section 230 (c)1] is intended to
overrule Stratton Oakmont's holding that online service providers can be held
to be 'publishers' of third party statements." Breisford, supra note 2, at 489.
Thus, Congress could speak to the holding in Zeran as well.
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on a defamation claim. Third, courts should recognize that
Congress found "[t]he Internet and other interactive com-
puter services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity,"" and "[i]ncreasingly
Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.""
Thus, courts must distinguish between content forums that
provide political discourse, such as typical "chat rooms,"28
from technical support sites. The former example warrants
the immunity granted by the CDA, the latter does not.
Courts should also distinguish between defamation
claims and causes of action such as negligent publication,
which are claims brought by consumers against companies
that in some form sell content with their product. When
companies provide defective content, the CDA should not
shield companies from liability just because an electronic
bulletin board is used in connection with the product. 9 Part
VI concludes that negligent publication of inaccurate state-
ments made by third parties based on a misrepresentation or
a strict liability theory should be applied to system operators
who knowingly publish false statements on electronic bulle-
tin boards.
II. TECHNICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Technical Language of the Internet
The Internet is an international network of intercon-
nected computers, used by millions of people worldwide-one
estimate indicates 200 million users by 1999.0 It is the me-
dium by which thousands of users through computer net-
works are able to connect and communicate with one an-
26. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1998).
27. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(5) (West
Supp. 1998).
28. A chat room is a "section of an on-line service where interactive textual
communication occurs among multiple users." Clara A. Pope, Liability Issues
for Online Service Providers, SB34 ALI-ABA 639, 643 (1997).
29. For example, access to technical support sites is often provided with the
purchase of a product. See Dell Computer Corporation
<http://support.dell.com/support/delltalk.htm>.
30. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
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other.3 The Internet is used to gain access to information all
around the world-to colleges and universities, corporations,
and public libraries. 2 Generally, one must subscribe to one
of the various commercial online services to have access to
the Internet.33 Under the definitions provided by the CDA,
these companies are referred to as "interactive computer
services."34
Most information on the Internet is found at electronic
locations called web sites. 5 In order to access a web site, a
user merely enters the electronic address of the site desired
or the user conducts a search and "surfs the web."36 "It is es-
timated by some that trillions of bits representing millions of
messages and files travel through [the Internet] each day."37
This vast amount of communication traffic prevents opera-
tors of large online service providers from completely policing
or otherwise controlling the content of all the messages that
are transmitted over the Internet.
38
More control over content is exercised by using "bulletin
board services" on the Internet. 9 Many Internet users utilize
electronic bulletin boards to interact with other users on web
31. See Ballon, supra note 3, for an excellent discussion of Internet issues
and technical language.
32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850.
33. Examples of commercial on-line service providers are America Online,
Inc., CompuServe, Inc., the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy. Id.
34.
The term 'interactive computer service' means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such sys-
tems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institu-
tions.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
35. A web site is an electronic location on the Internet, which is made up of
"[a] collection of documents (graphics, text, etc.) that are linked together [using
Internet communication language] .... " Pope, supra note 28, at 643.
36. "Surfing the web" is a phrase used to describe the activity of browsing
different subjects on the Internet; one need not have a target site in mind when
browsing.
37. Pope, supra note 28, at 670.
38. Pope, supra note 28, at 670.
39. A bulletin board service is the equivalent of a corkboard, except that it
is electronic. Generally, electronic bulletin boards consist of a public message
area, e-mail services, and uploading and downloading areas. Bulletin boards
vary in size, from large corporate sponsored boards to small privately operated
bulletin boards. See generally Tickle, supra note 1, at 394-95 (explaining the
technical details of how bulletin boards operate).
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sites by sending and receiving messages posted on the bulle-
tin board.4" Many online companies, corporations, and pri-
vate individuals offer bulletin board services on the Inter-
net.4 The individual or company that operates the bulletin
board is the "system operator" and ultimately controls who
has access to the system.42
The system operator may screen messages that are de-
livered to the bulletin board and if monitoring the bulletin
board, may decide which messages to post. 3  Thus, online
companies arguably exert more control over content posted
on bulletin boards than they do over messages transmitted
over the Internet in general." Newsgroups,
4 user groups, 46
and the Usenet47 are some common bulletin board services.48
B. Common Law Defamation
The first case 49 dealing with tortious conduct on the
Internet involved defamation. ° Defamation is the uttering of
words that "expose one to public hatred,
shame,... contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degrada-
40. Users may post messages and "speak" contemporaneously or post mes-
sages and delay answering. Thus, bulletin boards act like telephone conversa-
tion or the mail. See generally Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of System Operators
on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 130-31 (1996) (comparing phone
communication to chat group bulletin boards).
41. See Tickle, supra note 1, at 395.
42. See Scott K. Pomeroy, Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts in the Digital Domain: Copyright, Computer Bulletin Boards, and Liability
for Infringement by Others, 45 EMORY L.J. 1035, 1040 (1996).
43. See Bovenzi, supra note 40, at 99.
44. See id.
45. A newsgroup is "an electronic discussion group, serving as a bulletin
board for users to post universally accessible messages, and to read and reply
those from others." Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F.
Supp. 1519, 1524 n.4 (D. Colo. 1995).
46. A user group is generally a private bulletin board, limited in accessibil-
ity by the system operator. A private phone number or a password can limit
accessibility to the user group. See Bovenzi, supra note 40, at 99.
47. A Usenet is "a worldwide community of electronic [bulletin board serv-
ices] that is closely associated with the Internet and with the Internet commu-
nity." Ballon, supra note 3, at 567.
48. See Ballon, supra note 3, at 567.
49. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
50. This area of law and the Internet has been extensively discussed in
various articles and law reviews, so only a brief discussion will be given here.
See generally Pope, supra note 28 (discussing liability issues for online service
providers).
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tion or disgrace, or ... deprive one of their confidence and
friendly intercourse in society."5' Essential to tort liability is
communication of the defamation to someone other than the
person defamed. 2
"Publication" is the communication of a defamatory
statement to someone other than the person defamed." Pub-
lication can be oral or written, and under common law, one
who repeats, prints, or otherwise publishes a defamatory
statement made by another person is as liable for the state-
ment as the original speaker. 4 Therefore, those who manu-
facture books and print newspapers or magazines that con-
tain defamatory statements are liable "because they have the
opportunity to know the content of the material being pub-
lished.""
C. Distinction Between Distributors and Publishers
A person or entity (e.g., a newspaper) is a "publisher" of
defamation when the entity or individual takes part or oth-
erwise exercises control in the repetition of a statement. 6 As
explained above, publishers can be held liable for defamatory
statements contained in their publications even if they did
not know that the statement was in the publication because
they have the opportunity to know the content of the publica-
tion.57
51. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 186 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1933).
52. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 113, at 797 (5th ed. 1984).
53. Id.
54. See generally Cianci v. New York Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1980) (expressing the general rule that a republisher of defamatory material is
subject to the same liability as the original publisher); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) (explaining the liability of one who repub-
lishes).
55. KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 810.
56. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
57.
Those who manufacture books by way of printing and selling them, and
those who print and sell newspapers, magazines, journals, and the like,
are subject to liability as primary publishers because they have the op-
portunity to know the content of the material being published and
should therefore be subject to the same liability rules as are the author
and originator of the written material. This does not mean that such a
primary publisher is vicariously liable for the author's tortious con-
duct. It only means that the publisher is subject to liability for pub-
lishing with actual malice or negligence, depending upon the plaintiff's
status.
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Distributors, however, are held to a different standard
than newspaper publishers in defamation claims.58 A dis-
tributor is one "who circulates, sells or otherwise deals in the
physical embodiment of the published material."59 A dis-
tributor of defamatory statements cannot be held liable for
defamation unless it is shown that the distributor knew or
should have known of the defamatory nature of the state-
ment. o
Unlike a "publisher," a distributor is under no duty to
examine the publications and determine if any statements
found therein are defamatory.6 Lack of control over the con-
tent of the statement is the key element that shows that the
individual or entity is a distributor and, therefore, immune
from liability.62 However, this lack of control is a presump-
tion, and if it is shown that the distributor knew or should
have known of the defamation, liability can be found.6"
D. Defamation and the Internet
In Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc.,64 the plaintiff brought a li-
bel action against CompuServe for an alleged libel that was
posted on one of CompuServe's bulletin boards.65 Compu-
Serve owned and operated the bulletin board, but the court
held that it could not have been aware of the alleged state-
ments and was in fact not aware because of the number of
messages posted.66
The Cubby court held that CompuServe had no more edi-
torial control over the publication than did a library or book-
store, and that CompuServe was essentially "the functional
KEETON ET AL., supra note 52, § 113, at 810.
58. See Macaluso v. Mondadorit Publishing Co., 527 F. Supp. 1017
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
59. Bovenzi, supra note 40, at 135. Examples of distributors include news
dealers, bookstores, and libraries.
60. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581, cmt. d (1977)
(discussing the liability of written or printed repetition of oral defamation).
61. See id.
62. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
63. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581, cmt. d (1977)
(discussing the liability of written or printed repetition of oral defamation).
64. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 135.
65. Id. at 137.
66. Id.
913
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equivalent of a more traditional news vendor."67 Based on
this lack of control, the court held that CompuServe was a
mere "distributor" and could not be held liable for defamation
unless it could be shown that CompuServe knew or should
have known of the defamation posted on its bulletin board.68
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Inc.,69 the
court held that an online service provider, Prodigy, was liable
for a defamatory statement posted on its bulletin board.7"
The court found that Prodigy exercised sufficient control over
its bulletin board, thereby classifying the service provider as
a "publisher."7 Prodigy used an automatic software screen-
ing program to police activity on the bulletin board."2 Addi-
tionally, Prodigy used employees to monitor the content of
the bulletin boards in order to comply with certain company
guidelines.73 By making the choice to regulate content on its
bulletin boards, Prodigy exerted control over its bulletin
board service. Therefore, the Stratton court held that Prod-
igy was a publisher and not a "mere distributor."74 Prodigy
was found liable for the defamation.75
Congress responded to the holding reached in Stratton by
passing section 230 of the CDA 6 The relevant portion of the
CDA states, "In]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in-
formation provided by another information content pro-
vider." Section 230 of the CDA overruled Stratton and ap-
peared to confer distributor status to online service
providers."78 Congress intended to "remove the liability 'pen-
67. Id. at 140.
68. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
69. 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
70. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Inc., 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1794
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
71. Id. at 1796-97.
72. Id. at 1797.
73. Id. These guidelines were used to ensure that the content on the bulle-
tin board was free from pornography or other offensive material. Id.
74. Id. at 1798.
75. Id.
76. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (West Supp.
1998).
77. Id. § 230(c)(1).
78. The Act provides "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer serv-
ice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider." Id. Distributor status is not specifically
914 [Vol. 39
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alty' Stratton Oakmont imposed on those who exercised some
control over online content generated by others, including
third-party statements."' 9
Congress enacted the legislation to remove the disincen-
tive to online service providers to self-regulate created by the
Stratton court.80 Further, Congress wished to promote a pol-
icy that would encourage online service providers to block
and screen offensive material without fear of liability.8"
Therefore, Congress established that control was no longer
enough to maintain a defamation action against a system op-
erator. However, the question of whether or not liability
would be imposed on a system operator that knew or should
have known of the defamatory statement was left unan-
swered. 2
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.," the plaintiff sued the
defendant online service provider, America Online, Inc.
(AOL), arguing that section 230 of the CDA was inapplicable
to online service providers who possess notice of defamatory
material posted on their bulletin boards.84 Central to the
plaintiffs claim was his assertion that AOL acted as a dis-
tributor and, therefore, section 230 of the CDA did not apply
in granting the defendant immunity.85
After the Oklahoma City bombing of the federal building
on April 19, 1995, an unknown individual posted on AOL's
mentioned in the CDA, but arguably "Congress conferred 'distributor' status on
web site owners and online service providers." Breisford, supra note 2, at 489.
79. Breisford, supra note 2, at 489-90.
80. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
"The congressional Conference Committee Report specifically states that sec-
tion 509(c)(1) [section 230 (c)(1)] is intended to overrule Stratton Oakmont's
holding that online service providers can be held to be 'publishers' of third party
statements." Breisford, supra note 2, at 489.
81. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. "Fearing that the specter of liability would
therefore deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive mate-
rial, Congress enacted § 230's broad immunity 'to remove disincentives of the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate on-
line material."' Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (West Supp. 1998)).
82. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
83. Zeran,129 F.3d at 331.
84. Id. at 328. The plaintiff contended that "§ 230 [of the CDA] does not
apply.., because his claims [arose] from AOL's negligence prior to the CDA's
enactment." Id.
85. Id. at 330. The act states that online service providers shall not be
treated as publishers; no mention is made whether they can be treated as dis-
tributors. See supra note 78.
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SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
bulletin board an advertisement for the sale of offensive and
tasteless T-shirts relating to the bombing.86 Those wishing to
purchase the products were instructed to call "Ken" at the
plaintiffs home phone number.87 The plaintiff received abu-
sive phone calls, often every two minutes, including death
threats.88 The plaintiff chose not to change his number as he
relied on it in running his business in his home.88
The plaintiff contacted AOL and urged them to retract
the statement. 90 AOL did so, only to have another message
posted anonymously the next day, which related the same
content as the first message, but with new tasteless slogans
concerning the bombing. 9' Over the next four days, new mes-
sages appeared on the bulletin board including advertise-
ments for bumper stickers and key chains, along with in-
structions for callers to call back if busy due to high
demand.9 Matters became worse when a radio station an-
nouncer in Oklahoma City received a copy of the first posting
and urged listeners to call the number.9 The plaintiff was
"inundated with death threats and other violent calls from
Oklahoma City residents."94
The plaintiff urged AOL to retract the statements and
AOL told him that the account from where the messages
were posted would soon be closed.9" In bringing the action
against AOL, the plaintiff argued that AOL was negligent by
unreasonably delaying in removing the defamation, refusing
to post retractions, and failing to screen for similar postings
thereafter. 9 The plaintiff argued that by notifying AOL
about the message, AOL knew about the defamatory content
and thereby had a duty to remove the message promptly.97
Further, the plaintiff asserted that AOL's knowledge of the
defamation created a duty to screen for future defamatory









95. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. AOL stated that they would close the account
from where the messages were originating.
96. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
97. Id.
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material and was thus negligent in not doing so."
The plaintiffs assertion that AOL acted as a distributor
and not a publisher was central to the claim.99 Plaintiff ar-
gued that although section 230 barred liability to service pro-
viders as publishers, it did not immunize distributors who
have knowledge of defamatory content.100 As discussed above,
under common law, a distributor can be held liable for dis-
seminating defamatory content if it can be shown that the
distributor knew or should have known of the defamation. 0'
The defendant asserted the affirmative defense of section 230
of the CDA, claiming immunity from the alleged defama-
tion.' °2
The court stated that "[b]y its plain language, [section]
230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information origi-
nating with a third-party user of the service."' The court
held that AOL was not a distributor and as a publisher was
protected by section 230 of the CDA."' Further, the court
elaborated why distributors who receive notice about defama-
tory content should also be immune from third-party defama-
tion claims: "[i]f computer service providers were subject to
distributor liability, they would face potential liability each
time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory state-
ment from any party, concerning the message."' 0 Also, the
court stated, "[b]ecause the probable effects of distributor li-
ability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider
self-regulation are directly contrary to [section] 230's statu-
tory purposes, we will not assume that Congress intended to
leave liability upon notice [i.e., distributor liability] intact." 6
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 332.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. Further, the CDA states spe-
cifically that online service providers cannot be treated as a publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
The section leaves open the question of whether or not the online service pro-
vider could be treated as a distributor, and if as a distributor it knew or should
have known of the defamation, whether liability could be found. See supra note
78.
102. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
103. Id. at 330.
104. Id. at 327.
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id. "Liability upon notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced by §
230 of the CDA." Id. at 333.
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Thus, Zeran held that according to the policy behind sec-
tion 230 of the CDA, even a service provider acting as a dis-
tributor with knowledge of defamatory content is immune
from liability. °7 Additionally, the court stated that "[section]
230 creates federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information origi-
nating with a third-party user of the service." 8  Did Con-
gress intend to grant immunity from all causes of action
against service providers for the publication of information
that originates from third-party users? Or was section 230
only intended to immunize third party publishers of defama-
tory content from defamation claims?
This question is significant because other torts may pre-
sent themselves to online service providers that publish third
party statements over the Internet. For example, negligent
publication based on a misrepresentation theory or based on
a theory of strict liability for defective products may find li-
ability for the willful publication of inaccurate content.'0 9 In
order to analyze whether these claims may be brought
against system operators that control electronic bulletin
boards given the immunity granted by the CDA, it is neces-
sary to understand the background and legal theory of negli-
gent publication.
E. Negligent Publication
Negligent publication describes the various kinds of neg-
ligence suits brought by plaintiffs against publishers of defec-
tive information."0  Typically, claims involve plaintiffs who
have relied on content written in a publication (such as a
book or magazine), and as a consequence, suffer personal in-
jury or property damage."' Plaintiffs have generally sued
under either (1) a misrepresentation theory of negligence, or
107. Id. The court stated "[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service." Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 330 (emphasis added).
108. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
109. See discussion infra Part II.E.
110. See Terri R. Day, Publications That Incite, Solicit, or Instruct: Publisher
Responsibility or Caveat Emptor?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 98 (1995).
111. See generally Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.
1991); Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 883 P.2d 70 (Haw.
1992); Roman v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
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(2) based on a theory of strict liability for defective prod-
ucts.
1 12
Claims against publishers of content based on the mis-
representation theory of negligence have not been very suc-
cessful in the courts.113 Courts have stated that "so long as
the publisher has neither authored nor guaranteed the accu-
racy of the publication, injuries sustained by a plaintiff acting
in reliance on information contained in the publication [are]
not redressable under a negligence theory.""4 It is significant
to note, however, that courts have not found publishers to be
completely immune; the publisher may in fact be liable if he
guarantees the accuracy of the publication."' A publisher
guarantees the accuracy of a publication when he "willfully
originates" the content or circulates the information knowing
it to be false.116
Strict liability claims for defective products have also not
been very successful."7 Courts have refused to define "inac-
curate content" found in publications such as textbooks as
"products" for the purposes of strict liability suits."' How-
ever, although courts have generally not imposed strict li-
ability against publishers for the "defective ideas" they pub-
lish, courts have permitted suits brought by plaintiffs against
aeronautical chart publishers to go forward based on strict
liability for the defective content found in the chart."9
112. See Day, supra note 110, at 98.
113. Id. The author notes:
[i]n the publisher liability context, it is common practice for publishers
to publish and distribute a third-party author's work. Consequently,
courts have been reluctant to impose a guarantor's duty on publishers.
According to many courts, to impose such a duty would severely bur-
den publishers by requiring them to 'scrutiniz[e] and even [test] all
procedures contained in any of their publications.'
Day, supra note 110, at 75 (citing Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480
N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1986).
117. See discussion infra Part II.E.2.
118. See discussion infra Part II.E.2.
119. Aeronautical charts, also referred to as instrument approach charts, are
navigational aids used by pilots in making instrument approaches to airports.
The charts depict measurements of distance between airports, mountain
heights, runway lengths, directional headings, etc., essential for safely navi-
gating and landing an airplane. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.,
642 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing plaintiff to establish that an
aeronautical chart and the content in the chart were "products" for the pur-
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Thus, if inaccurate content is found in a textbook, courts
will not allow a strict liability claim to go forward against the
publisher of the textbook. However, if the defective content
is found in an aeronautical chart, courts may find strict li-
ability for defective products.12 ° Therefore, pertinent to the
legal issue presented in this comment 2' is whether defective
content knowingly published by a system operator on an elec-
tronic bulletin board is more like defective content published
in a textbook or an aeronautical chart.
122
1. Negligent Publication Cases Based on
Misrepresentation
A noted case advancing the theory of negligent publica-
tion is Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons.23 In Winter, the plain-
tiffs relied on information given in a mushroom encyclopedia
to decide which mushrooms were edible.'24 The plaintiffs
picked wild mushrooms, compared them to the descriptions
in the book, and cooked and ate their "harvest."125 The plain-
tiffs became critically ill and both required liver trans-
plants.121
The plaintiffs argued that the publisher had a duty to in-
vestigate the accuracy of the content of the mushroom book.127
The Winter court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dant publisher and held that the publisher had "no duty to
investigate the accuracy of the contents of the books it pub-
lishes. A publisher may of course assume such a burden, but
there is nothing inherent in the role of publisher or the sur-
rounding legal doctrines to suggest that such a duty should
be imposed on publishers." 28  The court's statement that a
poses of section 402A and that strict liability could be found against defendant
publisher).
120. This distinction is pointed out in several case books and is the subject of
several Law Review articles. Why courts treat aeronautical charts differently
than textbooks will be discussed in detail in Part II.E.2. See, e.g., Day supra
note 110.
121. See discussion infra Part III.
122. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
123. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
124. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991). The
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms is "a reference guide containing information on the
habitat, collection, and cooking of mushrooms." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1033.
128. Id. at 1037.
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publisher may assume the burden 129 is relevant to the ques-
tion presented in this comment. 3 ' By investigating the con-
tent of a textbook, the publisher assumes a duty of care to the
readers of third party statements.'
In Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.,32 the plaintiff, a newspaper
reader and securities investor, brought an action for negli-
gence against the defendant, Dow Jones, Inc., the publisher
and owner of the Wall Street Journal.3 ' The plaintiff alleged
that he relied to his detriment on incorrect information that
was printed in the Wall Street Journal concerning certain
corporate bonds.' The Journal mistakenly listed the corpo-
rate bonds as trading with interest when in fact they were
trading flat."' The plaintiff asserted that when the informa-
tion was corrected in a later publication, the market value of
the bonds decreased.'36 This drop in value forced him to sell
the bonds and he suffered a $1,692.50 loss.'37
The Gutter court dismissed the plaintiffs suit for failure
to state a claim and granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant publisher.3 8 The court's reasoning paralleled that of
the Winter court:
[i]n absence of a contract, fiduciary relationship, or inten-
tional design to cause injury, a newspaper publisher is not
liable to a member of the public to whom all news is liable
to be disseminated for a negligent misstatement in an
item of news, not amounting to libel, published by the
publisher, unless he willfully originates or circulates it
knowing it to be false, and it is calculated and does, as the
proximate cause, result in injury to another person.139
Thus, absent the special criteria articulated by the Gut-
129. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
130. See discussion infra Part III.
131. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1037 (citing Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr.
519, 521-22 (1969), where Good Housekeeping was held liable for defective
product because it had given the product its "Good Housekeeping's Consumer's
Guaranty Seal," and had made an independent examination of the product and
issued an express, limited warranty). Id.
132. 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986).
133. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986).
134. Id. at 899.
135. Id. at 900. The term "flat" means trading with unchanged interest.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 902.
139. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1986).
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ter court, publishers are generally immune from suits
brought by plaintiffs who rely on inaccurate information con-
tained in their publications.14 ° The Gutter court stated that a
publisher would be liable if he willfully originates the inaccu-
rate information or disseminates it knowing it to be false.'
It should be pointed out now that the holding in Gutter,4'
stated in the context of negligent publication based on mis-
representation, is contrary to the holding articulated in Ze-
ran. In the context of electronic bulletin boards, Zeran
would hold that even if a system operator disseminates the
information knowing it to be false and an individual is in-
jured due to reliance on the inaccurate content, the system
operator would nonetheless be immune. 144
In other negligence claims against publishers, plaintiffs
have attempted to base their claims on the theory that the
content of the publication was a "product."145 By defining the
content in this way, the plaintiff argues that the defendant
publisher of the defective content should be strictly liable un-
der section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 6
Courts, however, have not allowed such a suit to go forward





143. The Zeran Court stated, "[b]ecause the probable effects of distributor
liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider self-regulation
are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we will not assume that
Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact." Zeran v. America On-
line, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
144. Id.
145. This legal definition is significant, as it allows the plaintiff to sue under
the theory of strict liability for defective products. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
146. See discussion infra Part II.E.2.
147. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp 802, 803-04 (S.D.
Tex. 1983) (explaining where an individual died after attempting "autoerotic
asphyxiation" described in the magazine article and the court held that the con-
tent did not fall within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement); See
also Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (explaining
where a child plaintiff suffered eye injuries while performing an experiment
detailed in a science textbook that involved a ruler and a rubber band and the
court held that the plaintiff was not injured by use of the textbook in the man-
ner in which it was designed to be used, i.e., to read).
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2. Publication Cases Based on Strict Liability for
Defective Products
Several cases involving negligent publication have ad-
dressed the theory of strict liability for defective products.48
In Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., a nursing student brought a
products liability action against a publisher of a medical
textbook.'49 The plaintiff, after consulting the textbook,
treated herself for constipation by taking an enema consist-
ing of hydrogen peroxide and consequently suffered personal
injuries.5 °
The plaintiff argued that the content in the textbook was
a "product" and that because the content was defective and
resulted in her personal injury, the court should find the de-
fendant strictly liable.' Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts states:
52
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the use or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."13
The Lippincott court declined to extend strict liability to
the plaintiffs "defective content" theory and found that "no
case has extended section 402A to the dissemination of an
idea or knowledge in books or other published material.""4
The court aimed to protect "fundamental free speech princi-
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
149. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988).
150. Id. at 1216.
151. Id. at 1217.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
153. Id.
154. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988).
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ples" and protect against the chilling effect on expression. '
Although holding that inaccurate content was not a product,
the court failed to discuss its rationale.
156
However, the court in Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons' 7 of-
fered a rationale as to why defective ideas in books are not
products. ' As previously discussed,'59 the plaintiffs suffered
personal injury after relying on information published in a
mushroom guide.' ° In addition to the negligent misrepresen-
tation claim, the plaintiff argued that the defendant pub-
lisher was liable under a theory of strict liability for defective
products.' The Winter court rejected this theory as well, fo-
cusing on the fact that strict product liability law focuses on
the "tangible world" and the content in the publication could
not be defined as a product."'
In rejecting the theory that "defective content" qualified
as a product, the Winter court looked to the intent of the
drafters of section 402A.'63 The court stated, "[t]he American
Law Institute clearly was concerned with including all physi-
cal items but gave no indication that the doctrine should be
expanded beyond that area. " "' Also, the court emphasized
that society places a high priority on the "unfettered ex-
change of ideas" and "[t]he threat of liability without fault
(financial responsibility for our words and ideas in the ab-
sence of fault or a special undertaking or responsibility) could





157. 938 F.2d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
158. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
160. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1033.
161. Id. at 1034.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991). In
addition, the court stated that the policy of applying strict liability to defective
products rests on the theory that "the costs of damaging events due to defec-
tively dangerous products [are] best ... borne by the enterprisers who make
and sell these products." Id. at 1035 (citing PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 98, at 962-63 (5th ed. 1984)).
165. Id. See also Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises, 494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup.
Ct. 1985) (stating that strict liability is imposed "only against defendants who
are directly involved in the manufacture or distribution of the product which
caused the injury"). Although the publication involved in the Beasock case con-
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However, not all publishers are impervious to strict li-
ability under a section 402A claim. The Winter court noted
that publishers of aeronautical charts have been found
strictly liable under section 402A."' Indeed, courts have con-
sistently ruled that instrument approach charts67 and their
content are products under section 402A. 6'
The court first applied strict liability to an aeronautical
chart in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.'69
While on approach to Las Vegas, Nevada, an airplane from
Phoenix, Arizona crashed killing all aboard.7' In Aetna, the
airline insurer sued the publisher of instrument approach
charts, seeking indemnity for money paid in settlement of
several wrongful death actions filed by representatives of de-
ceased passengers."'
The plaintiff insurance company argued that the ap-
proach chart used by the pilots incorrectly depicted the geog-
raphy and scale of the landscape, and thus the graphics re-
lating to proper elevation were "defective." 172' The plaintiff
produced a witness that testified that a pilot and navigator
that relied on this information would make the incorrect as-
sumption about the scale of the approach in relation to
proper altitude, and a conflict would be created between the
chart and the information in the airplane's instruments.73
This conflicting information would result in an unreasonable
risk, as the pilot would question the accuracy of the on-board
instruments and the geographic chart.'74
The Aetna court held that the Las Vegas chart "radically
departed" from the graphics in other charts.' Further, the
tained faulty information which killed the plaintiffs husband, "the publications
themselves did not produce the injuries." Id.
166. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1981); Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 593 P.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1978); Halstead v.
United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982).
167. See supra note 119.
168. See Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982). See
also Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Saloomey v.
Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
169. Aetna, 642 F.2d 339.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 341.




175. Id. at 343.
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court held that the conflict created by the chart and the in-
formation conveyed by the airplane's instruments and words
from the control tower rendered the chart unreasonably dan-
gerous and a defective product.176 The Aetna court did not
elaborate as to why erroneous content in an aeronautical
chart qualified as a product whereas content in other publica-
tions do not."' This analysis did not appear until another
claim was brought against Jeppesen in another aeronautical
chart case, Halstead v. United States.'78
In Halstead, a small private plane crashed while at-
tempting a full instrument landing in West Virginia.'79 All
three passengers were killed including the pilot, his father,
and the pilot's son.'8° Because the airfield was not equipped
to execute a full instrument landing, it was unable to inform
the descending pilot of his approach altitude, causing the pi-
lot to crash into a ridge.' The plaintiff estate of the de-
ceased showed that the pilot relied on a Jeppesen aeronauti-
cal chart, which incorrectly indicated that the airfield could
execute a full instrument landing. '82
The plaintiff argued that the incorrect information ren-
dered the chart defective, and that Jeppesen should be held
strictly liable.' The defendant argued that it provided "pro-
fessional services" rather than products, so that strict liabil-
ity arising out of a sale of a defective product could not be
imposed.' Further, the essence of the sale of the paper chart
to the plaintiff "was the conveyance of information, [which]
constituted a service rather than a product and that the pa-
per the map was printed on was merely the method by which
the information was conveyed to subscribers." 8'
The Halstead court acknowledged that the defendant's
176. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir.
1981).
177. Id.
178. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982).
179. Id. at 783. Airfields that are capable of "full instrument landings" are
able to inform pilots of approach altitudes. The pilot relied on the chart, which
indicated that the airport could inform him of his altitude, when in fact it could
not. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 784.
182. Id. at 783.
183. Id. at 784.
184. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 789 (D. Conn. 1982).
185. Id.
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However, the court determined that the chart fit the defini-
tion of a product according to the policy rationale behind sec-
tion 402A. 187 "The official comments to Restatement Section
402A establish the doctrine of strict tort liability was princi-
pally intended to impose a special liability on those who
market defective products to the general public in a mass-
distribution context."88
The Halstead court indicated that the defendant fit the
traditional strict liability defendant; the company mass-
produced and distributed thousands of charts on the aviation
market.19  Therefore, reasoning that the defendant could
bear the cost by allocating the risk of injury through higher
prices and insurance, strict liability should be imposed. 9°
Thus, the reason that the defective content in the publi-
cation qualified as a product was not because it met the defi-
nition of a "tangible object."'9' Publishers of aeronautical
charts are held liable for defective content because it is con-
sistent with the policy behind section 402A to hold them
strictly liable.9  Thus, an additional question is raised in this
comment: does the defective content published on an elec-
tronic bulletin board meet the policy standards behind sec-
tion 402A to bring a strict liability claim for defective prod-
ucts?
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
Two legal problems are presented in this comment. The
answers to these questions are speculative, as there are no
cases that address negligent publication based on misrepre-
sentation in connection to section 230 of the CDA. 93 Cases
subsequent to the enactment of section 230 of the CDA are
186. Id.
187. Id. at 790-91. The court noted that section 402A applied because Jeppe-
sen "mass produced and distributed thousands of charts." Id.
188. Id. 790-91. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmts. c
and f (1965).
189. Halstead, 535 F. Supp. 791.
190. See Andrew T. Bayman, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in Publica-
tions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 557, 571 (1989).
191. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
192. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 791 (D. Conn. 1982).
193. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West Supp.
1998).
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clear as to the liability of system operators in relation to a
defamation claim.
194
The first legal problem is whether the CDA should be in-
terpreted to provide immunity to system operators in all
negligence claims for third party statements published on the
Internet. Second, when access to an online technical support
bulletin board is purchased as part of a software product, is
the content conveyed on the bulletin board a "product?"'95 In
other words, can a strict liability claim for defective products
be applied to a company that maintains and controls a tech-
nical support electronic bulletin board containing defective
information?
IV. ANALYSIS
The broad ruling in Zeran would indicate that service
providers are immune from all tort-based claims for the pub-
lication of third-party statements on the Internet because of
section 230 of the CDA. 96 Thus, Zeran not only affects
Cubby 97 in the context of defamation claims, 99 but also af-
fects Winter'99 and Gutter °° in claims involving negligent
publication based on misrepresentation. °' Zeran would
thereby alter the rule of law established by Winter and Gut-
194. See discussion supra Part II.D. See also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting summary judgment to the system operator
because of the immunity granted by the CDA, even though it paid the defen-
dant gossip columnist who created allegedly defamatory statements).
195. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
196. The court stated in Zeran:
[s]pecifically, [section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims
that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role.
Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise
of a publisher's traditional functions-such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content-are barred. The purpose
of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern. Congress recog-
nized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in
the new and burgeoning Internet medium.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
197. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
198. See supra Part II.D.
199. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
200. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1986).
201. The Winter court stated "a publisher may of course assume such a bur-
den [to investigate the accuracy of the contents of the books it publishes]." See
supra note 129 and accompanying text. The Gutter court stated "a newspaper
publisher is not liable ... unless he willfully originates or circulates it knowing
it to be false .... " See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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202ter, and although the central holding of Winter and Gutter
would be preserved,2 °3 the rationale that publishers are not
completely immune from third party statements would be
overruled.2 °4 Was the Zeran court correct in assuming that
Congress intended to grant system operators broad immunity
from all tort-based causes of action for the publication of
third-party statements, or was the immunity granted by the
CDA intended only to cover defamation claims?
A. The CDA Was Only Intended to Overrule Stratton
Congress, in enacting section 230 of the CDA, specified
its intent to overrule the holding in Stratton.2°' The context
of the Stratton case involved liability for the repetition of de-
famatory third party statements. 6 Recognizing that system
operators policed offensive content posted on their bulletin
boards, Congress enacted legislation that would not discour-
age system operators from exercising control over their web
sites.27 Therefore, because Congress only intended to over-
rule Stratton, the courts should read the statute more nar-
rowly and only apply it in the context of defamation claims.
Zeran infers that the statute applies to all causes of ac-
tion relating to third party statements.2 8 However, given the
context of the statute, this is not necessarily the case. Con-
gress wished to protect and encourage the "positive" policing
of the Internet and bulletin boards.2 9 Although Congress
wished to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet,"210 the statute should
202. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1986). The rule
simply stated is that a publisher of a third-party statement can be held liable
for the accuracy of the statement if it assumes the burden by "investigating the
accuracy of the statement" or "willfully originates or circulates the statement
knowing it to be false." Id.
203. Courts have stated that "so long as the publisher has neither authored
nor guaranteed the accuracy of the publication, injuries sustained by a plaintiff
acting in reliance on information contained in the publication [are] not redress-
able under a negligence theory." See Day, supra note 110.
204. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
205. "The Conference Committee Report specifically states that section
509(c)(1) [section 230(c)(1)] is intended to overrule Stratton Oakmont's hold-
ing .... " Breisford, supra note 2, at 489.
206. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
207. See discussion supra Part II.D.
208. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
210. Congressional findings were noted in the CDA's enactment. See Breis-
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not necessarily protect system operators from all torts re-
lated to the publication of third party statements. Immu-
nizing a system operator who knowingly and willfully trans-
mits inaccurate content on an electronic bulletin board does
not promote the "vibrant speech" policy behind the CDA.
Some bulletin boards, such as technical support sites, are not
intended to be a forum for exchanging "ideas" at all. Rather,
individuals accessing these sites specifically rely on the con-
tent found on the electronic bulletin board in order to main-
tain and service a product purchased from the company oper-
ating the technical support site. Given this example, it
should not be the case that because an individual or entity is
a system operator and publisher of inaccurate content of a
third person, that he or she will automatically receive the
broad immunity of the CDA as interpreted by the Zeran
court.
B. System Operators May Act as Distributors
As the court in Cubby explained, system operators may
act more like a distributor of information than a publisher. 211
Finding for the defendant system operator, the Cubby court
stated that CompuServe could only be liable as a distributor
if it knew or had reason to know of the defamation.212 The
court recognized potential liability of the system operator if
the defendant would have published the defamatory state-
ments with knowledge.
This potential liability recognized by the court in Cubby
were presented as facts in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services, Inc.,1 4 which involved a system operator that ac-
tively policed third party statements and allowed a defama-
tory statement to be published. The court found the defen-
dant liable for the defamation and prompted Congress to
decree that "In]o provider or user of an interactive computer
ford supra note 2, at 521.
211. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The
court stated that CompuServe was the equivalent of "an electronic, for profit
library." Id. at 140-41.
212. Id.
213. "Cubby v. CompuServe does not resolve what happens when the [system
operator] is aware of the contents and allows distribution anyway. It might be
inferred from the decision that in such a case the [system operator] would be as
liable as the primary publisher." See Bonvenzi, supra note 40, at 124.
214. 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in-
formation provided by another information content pro-
vider."215 Although the CDA was created specifically in re-
sponse to Stratton's holding,216 the Zeran court interpreted
the statute to create "federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service."217 This
language in Zeran may therefore be too broad; Congress en-
acted the legislation in the context of a defamation claim and
wished to promote positive "policing" by system operators.
C. Zeran Overrules a Portion of Cubby
According to Zeran, system operators of bulletin boards
would be impervious to any claim involving the transmission
of information originating from third parties, with or without
knowledge. 18 The Zeran court, therefore, would overturn
rules of law established in Cubby.1 9
The Zeran court reasoned that Congress intended to
grant broad immunity to system operators for the statements
of third parties regardless of the system operator's knowledge
of the statements.2 The court stated that distributor liabil-
ity might be feasible "for the traditional print publisher, [but]
the sheer number of postings on interactive computer serv-
ices would create an impossible burden in the Internet con-
text."221 If the court in Zeran is correct, system operators re-
ceive protection not only from defamation claims, but from
negligent publication claims as well.
215. Communications Deceny Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1998).
216. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). "The
congressional Conference Committee Report specifically states that § 509(c)(1)
[§ 230(c)(1)] is intended to overrule Stratton Oakmont's holding that online
service providers can be held to be 'publishers' of third party statements."
Breisford, supra note 2, at 489.
217. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added). The court further stated,
"[Section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a
computer service provider in a publisher's role." Id.
218. Id.
219. See discussion supra Part II.D. See also supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text.
220. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
221. Id.
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D. Zeran Would Overrule Law Articulated in Winter and
Gutter
Immunity from liability for third party statements in all
causes of action would logically include claims for negligent
publication based on a misrepresentation theory or strict li-
ability for defective products.222 Thus, even if a system opera-
tor knew of inaccurate content posted by a third party on a
bulletin board, and circulated it anyway, another person who
relied on that information to his or her detriment would not
have a claim.223 This result would be contrary to the ration-
ale expressed in Gutter and Winter, which would find pub-
lishers liable for the inaccurate statements of third parties
when the publishers have knowledge of the statements.224
The defendant publishers were found not liable for negli-
gent publication in Winter and Gutter.25 However, the sys-
tem operator in the hypothetical expressed in Part I would be
found liable according to the rationale of the Winter and Gut-
ter courts. 26 The Winter court expressed that although no
duty of inspection existed, the publisher could assume the
duty to investigate the accuracy of the content, and would
thereby owe a duty to a reader of that information. 227 By in-
vestigating the accuracy of the content, it could be argued
that the publisher becomes the guarantor of the information
by subsequently choosing to circulate the inaccurate informa-
tion.2  By analogy, a system operator of a technical support
site that has knowledge of false information disseminated on
its bulletin board would in effect act as a guarantor of that
information.
The Gutter court also held the publisher could be liable if
it willfully circulated inaccurate information that it knew
was false. 29 The Gutter court was concerned about "ex-
222. See discussion supra Part II.D. (explaining no liability for any cause of
action for third party statements and the promotion of the broad policy stated
in the comments of section 230 of the CDA).
223. See hypothetical supra Part I.
224. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part II.E.1.
226. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
227. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).
228. See id. at 1036. The court stated "[u]nless it is assumed that the pub-
lisher is a guarantor of the accuracy of an author's statements of fact.., no
case [for liability can be made]." Id.
229. See discussion supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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tend[ing] liability to all the world and not a limited class,"23°
and discussed that these limited groups may be liable in cer-
tain fiduciary relationships. 231' A bulletin board operator of a
specialized technical support site chooses which information
to post and which information not to post.232 The choice a
system operator has to post the inaccurate information of a
third party arguably qualifies as willful circulation. A spe-
cialized bulletin board like a technical support web site does
not carry the danger of extending liability to "all the world,
but only to a limited class of customers. 33 Under the facts of
the hypothetical, 234 a bulletin board operator should be liable
for the publication of inaccurate content if it knew that the
information was inaccurate.35
E. Congressional Intent Promoting Free Speech Does Not
Apply to Technical Support Sites
Congress stated that the policy behind section 230 of the
CDA 36 was to promote the Internet as a "forum for a true di-
versity of political discourse ,"2 ' and also to allow a "vibrant
and competitive free market [of ideas]."'38 Technical support
bulletin boards that allow customers to interact about a com-
pany's product are not the kind of speech Congress intended
to protect.239 The statute was enacted in light of defamatory
211
speech.
The rule established in Zeran, however, creates immu-
nity for any liability associated with promoting the circula-
tion of inaccurate statements occurring on a company oper-
ated bulletin board.241  A highly specialized bulletin board
owned by a company offering technical support for its product
hardly fits into the "true diversity of ideas" realm that Con-
230. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1986).
231. Id.
232. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
234. See discussion of hypothetical supra Part I.
235. See discussion of hypothetical supra Part I.
236. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (West Supp.
1998).
237. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
the comments found in section 230(a)(3) of the CDA).
238. Id.
239. See discussion of hypothetical supra Part I.
240. See supra Part II.D.
241. See hypothetical supra Part I.
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gress intended to promote by granting immunity to online
system providers.2 42 A specialized system operator that uses
the statute to shield liability when she knows information
relating to her products is inaccurate runs counter to the
congressional policy of promoting political discourse and al-
lowing "vibrant" speech.
41
Thus, the argument that Congress intended to grant
immunity to all causes of action relating to the dissemination
of third party statements is not clear, as was held by the Ze-
ran court.2 44 Zeran's broad ruling would overturn significant
legal precedents established in Winter and Gutter. This
holding by the Zeran court would allow a system operator
publisher to promote and sell its products without fear of li-
ability-while profiting from the use of electronic bulletin
boards which may cause harm to the user.
2 45
F. Bulletin Board Content is Arguably a Product When
Included as Part of the Purchase of Other Products
Although the Internet itself is a vast medium of commu-
nication,246 the operation of bulletin board services creates the
ability of system operators to take control over the content
circulated.4 7 Inquiries concerning the company products and
dialogue from various customers arguably represent a finan-
cial interest to the company. The company may become
aware of product problems more quickly and efficiently and
may be able to learn the product needs and desires of its cus-
tomers. This efficiency is an economic incentive to offer the
electronic bulletin board as part of the purchase of its prod-
uct. Thus, promoting free speech may not be the purpose for
operating a technical support site; it is to sell more and bet-
ter quality products to the company's customers.4 8
Technical support is often a reason why individuals pur-
242. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
244. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
245. Id.
246. See Ballon supra note 3.
247. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
248. "The official comments to Restatement Section 402A establish that the
doctrine of strict liability in tort was principally intended to impose a special
liability on those who market defective products to the general public in a
mass-distribution context." Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 790-91
(D. Conn. 1982).
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chase certain computer and software products.249 Although
the information on a technical support site is "intangible,"
and therefore difficult to conceive that the content found on it
is a "product," the policy rationale behind section 402A and
articulated by the Halstead court may nonetheless find li-
ability.25 °
The Jones court noted that no case had extended strict
liability to the dissemination of ideas or knowledge in books
or other published material.25 The rationale for not doing so
was stated to protect the principles of free speech and ensure
that "a chilling effect" would not be felt on expression. 252 The
Winter court stated that strict liability should only be applied
when supported by the policy behind section 402A.2" The
court stated "the costs of damaging events due to defectively
dangerous products [are] best ... borne by the enterprisers
who make and sell these products."254 Since textbook pub-
lishers did not, according to the court, meet these criteria,
textbook publishers could not be held strictly liable under
section 402A.25
Subsequent "aeronautical chart cases" clarified the dis-
tinction and rationale for holding publishers of defective
charts strictly liable.21 6  The defendant in Halstead argued
that the information on the chart was a service to the cus-
249. Many computer users require excellent technical support as a criterion
for making a computer purchase. Thus, companies advertise what their "tech-
nical support rating" is in order to attract customers. See Dell Computer Cor-
poration <http://www.dell.com/support/index.htm> (technical support site
stating "[c]ustomers rank Dell #1 for web-based support").
250. In considering whether or not to apply section 402A of the Restatement
to defective content in textbooks, the court in Winter stated, "[t]he American
Law Institute clearly was concerned with including all physical items but gave
no indication that the doctrine should be expanded beyond that area [into the
area of intangibility]." Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th
Cir. 1991). However, in Halstead, the court applied strict liability to the defec-
tive content in the aeronautical chart based on the policy rationale of section
402A. "The official comments to Restatement Section 402A establish the doc-
trine of strict tort liability was principally intended to impose a special liability
on those who market defective products to the general public in a mass-
distribution context." Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 790-91 (D.
Conn. 1982).
251. Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988).
252. Id.
253. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1991).
254. Id. at 1035.
255. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
256. See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
935
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tomer, not a product.25 ' The defendant raised the tangi-
ble/intangible distinction made by the courts in the textbook
cases.25 The chart manufacturer urged that its "service" was
"intangible" and it thus should not be held strictly liable.259
Nonetheless, the defendant was found strictly liable.26 °
The operator and owner of a technical support site could
make the same arguments that the defendant did in Hal-
stead. A system operator might argue that the technical
support site is a "service" to the customer, as it allows the
customer to engage in dialogue with other customers con-
cerning the product. Furthermore, the essence of the trans-
action is the purchase of the software itself, not the bulletin
board service. Finally, the American Law Institute, in
drafting section 402A, certainly did not contemplate the in-
tangible realm of the Internet.26'
However, courts have acknowledged that the "intangible"
and "tangible world" argument is problematic and, therefore,
is not determinative in finding strict liability.262 What is de-
terminative is whether or not it is good policy to hold the
publisher of third party statements strictly liable. 263 The fact
that the company mass-produces the product to the general
public is one factor used to determine candidacy for strict li-
ability.24 The other factor indicated by the court is whether
or not the company has the ability to bear the cost by allo-
cating the risk of injury through higher prices.265
Computer hardware and software, for example, are
mass-produced to the general public. The Internet is be-
coming the dominant medium of communication to sell and
support these mass-produced products.266 Also, the operation
of a specialized technical support site is not significantly dif-
ferent from customers who come to the manufacturer's store
257. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 789 (D. Conn. 1982).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 791.
261. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rationalizing that if the American Law Institute did not consider it, it was
probably not meant to be covered under strict liability).
262. Halstead, 535 F. Supp. at 789.
263. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 791 (D. Conn. 1982).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See generally Tickle, supra note 1.
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to discuss its products.267
The policy and rationale articulated by the Halstead
court in strict liability claims for defective content is satisfied
in technical support bulletin board cases. If the product is
software, prices can be raised to insulate the manufacturer
from risk if the manufacturer chooses to offer a technical
support bulletin board.268 The fact that the manufacturer
economically benefits from the operation of a technical sup-
port site gives further indication that the manufacturer can
insulate the risk by passing that cost onto the customer.
Thus, technical support sites, when purchased as part of
software or hardware products, for example, are arguably
more like aeronautical charts than textbooks.
V. PROPOSAL
As Congress drafted the CDA in reaction to the holding
in Stratton, Congress should articulate whether the holding
in Zeran was correct in granting immunity to system opera-
tors for "all claims involving statements made by third par-
ties."269 Prohibiting claims involving negligent publication on
technical support bulletin boards will deprive injured claim-
ants of a remedy and at the same time shield the enriched
manufacturer. This is not good policy.
It is reasonable to shield system operators from the li-
ability associated with third party statements in order to
promote free speech concerns articulated in Zeran. However,
when free speech is not at issue, as with specialized technical
support bulletin boards such as the one hypothesized in Part
I of this comment, liability should not be shielded. As dis-
cussed, financial concerns, not the "promotion of free speech,"
motivate companies to utilize technical support sites. Thus,
these forums should not be protected by the CDA.
Congress, in its clarification of the CDA, should identify
the kinds of bulletin boards that are protected under the
CDA. Those bulletin boards that are identified as promoting
the policies of the CDA will maintain protection, while those
that are created and designed to promote a company's prod-
267. The transmission of inaccurate information in a manufacturer's store
has been the basis of many "failure to warn" cases brought under section 402A.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965).
268. See'supra note 190 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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ucts will not be immunized. Certainly, Congress can estab-
lish criteria that would aid the courts in distinguishing "free
speech" bulletin boards and bulletin boards that are solely
used to sell and maintain products.
For example, courts could consider who operates the
bulletin board and their relationship with the user of the
bulletin board. This criterion would distinguish company
technical support forums, from electronic forums used for po-
litical or societal discussions between users. Customer sup-
port forums should not receive the protection from the CDA.
Again, promoting free speech is not the intent of operating a
technical support site; the intent is to promote and maintain
company products.
The number of users of the bulletin board may be rele-
vant in discerning whether the bulletin board is specialized
like a technical support site, or if it is a more general forum
for all forms of discussion. Generally, technical support sites
offer a limited number of users the ability to discuss a com-
mon concern-the product of the company. In addition,
courts could consider how the user is able to access the web
site-whether accessibility was purchased as part of a prod-
uct from the owner of the electronic bulletin board, or if the
user pays a fee in order to "chat" with other users. This cri-
terion will distinguish free speech forums from "forums for
product development." The latter should not be protected by
the CDA.
The attempt to classify bulletin board content as a prod-
uct for the purpose of finding strict liability may be problem-
atic.27° However, it is plausible to conceive of information on
the bulletin board as a "product" when included with the pur-
chase of software or hardware.27' The potential injury caused
by defective content on an electronic bulletin board may be
considered less in magnitude than an airplane crash,272 but
the potential number of injuries from defective information is
substantial considering the fact that millions of Internet us-
ers access bulletin boards.7 Defective content has the poten-
270. Considering the fact that strict liability has only been found in a few
select content cases, like aeronautical charts, it seems unlikely that the courts
will be inclined to open a new door of strict liability in the publication context.
271. See hypothetical supra Part I.
272. See Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982).
273. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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tial to reach more people, more quickly than ever before.274
When a system operator of a technical support electronic
bulletin board knows that the content is inaccurate, the sys-
tem operator should be liable for the personal injury or prop-
erty damage that results.275
The courts should consider strict liability claims against
system operators of technical support bulletin boards because
it is consistent with the policy considerations behind section
402A. When an individual purchases both software and the
ability to access a technical support electronic bulletin board,
the content found on the bulletin board is arguably a product.
Finding strict liability for defective content found on techni-




If the system operator of a technical support bulletin
board has knowledge of inaccurate information disseminated
on his or her bulletin board, that operator should be liable for
personal injury or property damage that a customer suffers
because of his or her reliance on that information. The cus-
tomer should be able to bring a negligent misrepresentation
claim or a strict liability claim against the hardware or soft-
ware manufacturer. Section 230 of the CDA should be con-
strued as granting immunity to system operators in defama-
tion claims only and courts should limit the holding of Zeran.
In the hypothetical posed in Part I of this comment, a
customer that has purchased, as part of her software product,
the ability to access a technical support bulletin board,
should not be left without a remedy. Immunizing all claims
against a system operator who knows of inaccurate content
as described in the hypothetical would create an unfair re-
sult. Until Congress offers a clarification as to the narrow-
ness or broadness of the CDA, courts should allow claims of
negligent publication against operators of technical support
electronic bulletin boards to go forward.
David Wiener
274. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part III.F.
276. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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